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HANA SREbOTNjAk
TRAcINg THE DEcLINE OF YugOSLAv  IDENTITY: 
A cASE FOR  ‘INvISIbLE’ ETHNIc cLEANSINg
AbSTRAcT
This essay explores the concept of invisible ethnic cleansing 
by examining the remaining group of self-identifying Yugo-
slavs who continue to identify themselves as such despite 
the break-up of Yugoslavia, the country that shaped and con-
stituted the focal point of their identity. The analysis argues 
that the lack of recognition of the Yugoslav identity during 
the country’s disintegration as well as afterwards in the indi-
vidual republics befitted the new nationalistic and distinctly 
anti-Yugoslav narratives adopted by individual post-Yugoslav 
republics. The sheer existence and acknowledgment of the 
Yugoslav identity could therefore disprove the new nation-
alistic tenets. The essay begins by setting up an analytical 
framework for the study of invisible ethnic cleansing and Yu-
goslav identity by examining the concepts of ethnic cleansing, 
nationalism, group destruction and ethnicity. It goes on to es-
tablish the historical background for Yugoslavia’s break up and 
looks at Yugoslavia’s ‘nationalities policy’, the break up itself 
and the role of the West and the Western media. Finally, the 
study identifies the hegemonic power of current nation-states 
reflected in the media, education and government-sponsored 
intellectual efforts, as those that control the image of the past 
can erase from it the memory of the disappeared states and 
the identities connected to them. The bulk of the analysis 
and the conclusions drawn were based on personal memoires 
and accounts of self-identifying Yugoslavs in order to preserve 
the memories of marginalized and forgotten groups as well as 
to stress the importance of counter-memory, which can chal-
lenge the narrative promoted by dominant groups and oppres-
sive states. Moreover, the novel concept of invisible ethnic 
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cleansing introduced will allow scholars to examine the loss of supranational identities, which ac-
company the dissolutions of multinational states.
k e y  w o r d s: Post-Yugoslavia; invisible ethnic cleansing; identity loss; nationalism; politics of mem-
ory; historical amnesia; Yugonostalgia
jAk gINIE TOżSAmOść jugOSłOwIAńSkA: pRzYpADEk „NIEwIDzIALNEj” 
czYSTkI ETNIczNEj
S t r e s z c z e n i e
esej podejmuje kwestię niewidzialnej czystki etnicznej, w oparciu o badania nad grupą osób samoiden-
tyfikujących się jako jugosłowianie, które nadal tak właśnie siebie identyfikują pomimo rozpadu jugo-
slawii -- kraju, który ukształtował ich tożsamość i stworzył dla niej punkt odniesienia. Analiza dowodzi, 
że nieuznawanie tożsamości jugosłowiańskiej w okresie dezintegracji jugosławii i po rozpadzie tego 
kraju w poszczególnych republikach przyniosło nowe nacjonalistyczne i wyraźnie antyjugosłowiańskie 
narracje przyjęte przez poszczególne republiki postjugosłowiańskie. Samo istnienie i uznanie tożsamo-
ści jugosłowiańskiej mogłoby zatem podważać nowo wyznaczone nacjonalistyczne cele. Autorka naj-
pierw wyznacza ramy analitycznego podejścia do niewidzialnej czystki etnicznej i tożsamości jugosło-
wiańskiej poprzez analizę takich pojęć, jak: czystka etniczna, nacjonalizm, destrukcja grupy i etniczność. 
Następnie przechodzi do omówienia historycznego tła rozpadu jugosławii i „polityki narodowościowej” 
jugosławii, samego rozpadu kraju oraz roli, jaką odegrał Zachód i media zachodnie. Ostatnia część opra-
cowania zawiera ustalenia odnoszące się do hegemonii władzy współczesnych państw narodowych, 
która odzwierciedla się w mediach, szkolnictwie i wspieranych przez rząd wysiłkach intelektualnych, ci 
bowiem którzy zawiadują obrazem przeszłości mogą z niej wymazać pamięć o państwach, które prze-
stały istnieć i o związanych z nimi tożsamościach. Analiza i wnioski w zasadniczej części opierają się 
na wspomnieniach osobistych i relacjach samoidentyfikujących się jugosłowian, którzy dążą do zacho-
wania pamięci o marginalizowanych i zapomnianych grupach, jak też podkreślenia wagi kontrpamięci, 
mogącej stać się wyzwaniem dla narracji promowanej przez grupy dominujące i opresyjne państwa. 
Ponadto, wprowadzona tu nowa koncepcja niewidzialnej czystki etnicznej pozwoli badaczom zgłębiać 
utratę tożsamości ponadnarodowych, która towarzyszy rozpadowi państw wielonarodowościowych.
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: jugosławia; niewidoczna czystka etniczna; utrata tożsamości; nacjonalizm; 
polityka pamięci; amnezja historyczna; jugonastalgia
The term ethnic cleansing, etničko  čiščenje  in Serbo-Croatian, which originated in and was first used by the paramilitaries in former Yugoslavia to describe their po-litical agenda, entered the Western discourse in 1992 with the break up of Second 
Yugoslavia (end of Second War – 1991) and the extreme violence that accompanied the 
secession of its individual states. The close of the 20th century saw in the territory of 
former Yugoslavia an unforeseen level of brutality, which particularly distressed europe 
after a period of relative peace since World War II. The instances of genocide in bosnia, 
the exceptional human losses in all of the republics, and the ruthless sexual violence en-
capsulate the tragedy that was the Yugoslav war. Consequently, the bulk of the literature 
written on Yugoslavia’s end thus far revolved around forms of violence and sought expla-
nations for its seemingly unforeseen eruption. by shifting the focus away from an issue 
that has hitherto preoccupied official narratives, the following analysis will draw attention 
to the more subtler ways in which identity cleansing occurred in the region. To revise our 
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attention away from the conflict’s brutal façade is to acknowledge the intricate nature of 
the Yugoslav conflict, something Western politicians and the media in particular struggled 
with as the crisis reached its peak. The focal point of the following study is the remain-
ing number of self-identifying Yugoslavs, one of many nationalities of the bygone country 
whose gradual decline can attest to a form of ‘invisible’ ethnic cleansing.
The information consulted and the conclusions derived from the analysis rely on 
a number of sources including memoirs and interviews with a group of self-identified Yu-
goslavs called Naša jugoslavija (Our Yugoslavia).1 The interviews were conducted in Slo-
venian and Serbo-Croatian2 and afterwards transcribed and translated into english. Due 
to the level of censorship regarding the Yugoslav past and the degree at which politics 
of memory and history enabled the erasure of Yugoslavs from the socio-political reality 
of everyday citizens, the collective memory approach proves impossible in the case of 
Yugoslavs and their personal accounts are virtually the only insight into the surviving iden-
tity available to scholars. Moreover, sample interviews can account for alternative, in this 
case forgotten, aspects of the social sphere and have as such invaluably contributed to 
this study and the exploration of the ending of Yugoslavia more generally. by using per-
sonal narratives this analysis is a critical examination of ‘bottom-up’ history, ‘which looks 
not at but through events, individuals and informal organizations’(Adler, 2001, p. 277) and 
is therefore most suitable at reconstructing the experiences and the changes in the posi-
tion of Yugoslavs amid Second Yugoslavia and now.
In the 1980 census, 1.5 million people declared themselves Yugoslav. (Drakulić, 2012, 
p. 129) After the war, the Yugoslav identity remained; largely dispersed around the world 
and its members less willing to identify themselves as such in official surveys. The con-
tinuation of their identity in the post-war period became largely overshadowed by the 
bloody and in places even genocidal spectacle orchestrated by extreme nationalists, 
which bewildered and engulfed most of the academic research thereafter. This essay will 
firstly examine the terminology of concepts key to the investigation, secondly, establish 
the context within which the cleansing occurred and finally, look at the methods through 
which it was achieved. These include identity declarations and anti-intellectual efforts in-
fluenced by the politics of memory: historical amnesia, confiscation of memory and alte-
rations of the school curriculums and lastly, the detrimental terminology used by the po-
litical elites to discredit their opponents instrumental to invalidating the Yugoslav identity.
1 Naša jugoslavija is an organisation composed of members from ex-Yugoslav republics who identify as Yu-
goslav not in a political (i.e. Socialist) but in a national sense. Majority belong to a generation educated in the 
Socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia, an education that according to its members imparted them with the 
principles of a peaceful, joint and prosperous cohabitation in the region and gave them a sense of security 
and dignity. The group’s main goals are stabilising the relations between all Yugoslav nations and fostering 
reconciliation amongst its peoples by, amongst other, removing the widely endorsed misconceptions pres-
ent in official narratives on Yugoslav history. (‘Naša jugoslavija’, n.d.)
2 Correspondents repeatedly refered to their language as standardised Serbo-Croat, the common language 
of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins and residents of bosnia-Hercegovina as agreed in Novi Sad in 1954, rather 
than the individual Croatian and Serbian languages as they have existed after the break-up. (Pavkovič, 2001, 
p. 138) Official languages of Yugoslavia were Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian, although Serbian 
and Croatian variations were also recognized as distinct languages for legal intentions due to the subtle dif-
ferences in the spelling, orthography and vocabulary between the two. (ramet, 1992, p. 56).
 One of the Naša jugoslavija correspondents pointed at the linguistic similarity between the two languages 
and linked their current dissociation to the nationalist turn in the political domain of the newly formed inde-
pendent states. Indeed, it is noteworthy to draw attention to one of the first cultural attempts to promote 
Croatian national feeling, which was concerned with the Croatian language, the ‘Declaration Concerning the 
Name and the Position of the Croatian literary language’ (Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog 
jezika) signed and published by Croatian intellectuals in March 1967. The document was a renunciation of 
the Novi Sad agreement and in calling for full linguistic separation, the declaration prompted other forms 
of Serbo-Croat cooperation to be challenged as well. (Wachtel, 1998, p. 184).
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EXpLORINg TERmINOLOgY:   
ETHNIc cLEANSINg, gROup DESTRucTION, ETHNIcITY
The topic of ‘invisible’ ethnic cleansing requires one to critically probe into the official 
terminology to evade confinement within the rigid boundaries produced by definitions. 
The following section will examine the scholarship on the subject of first ethnic clean-
sing, second, on group destruction and finally, on ethnicity.
In a report from May 1994 prepared by the Commission of experts under a United Na-
tions Security Council resolution, which affirmed instances of Genocide and ethnic Clean-
sing in bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, ethnic Cleansing is defined as:
“a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror
-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geo-
graphic areas. To a large extent it is carried out in the name of misguided nationalism, historic 
grievances and a powerful driving sense of revenge.” (United Nations, Security Council, 1994, 
p. 33)
Similarly, bell-Fialkoff, an expert in the field, defined ethnic cleansing as “a planned, 
deliberate removal from a certain territory of an undesirable population distinguished by 
one or more characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, race, class or sexual preference.” 
(bell-Fialkoff, 1996, p. 4) According to the two interpretations, the demise in the number 
of Yugoslavs cannot constitute an instance of ethnic cleansing. Yugoslavs were never 
identified as an undesirable population by any individual Yugoslav state—their inception 
was never even promoted by Yugoslavia—and as such their disappearance can be con-
sidered neither planned nor deliberate. However, by shifting the focus to the subtler me-
chanisms of identity cleansing, we can recognise that what was deliberately planned and 
accomplished by the political elites of the newly independent nation states was the de-
struction of the Yugoslav idea upon which that identity was based. The Yugoslav idea tied 
the different Yugoslav nations together and became the basis for the incipient Yugoslav 
identity. In contrast, the nationalist discourse that developed in individual republics and 
was embedded within the Yugoslav conflict, denied the commonalities between the dif-
ferent nations and the accompanying possibility of cohabitation in one Yugoslavia based 
on these shared characteristics.
The forms and practices that a policy of ethnic cleansing takes on constitute crimes 
against humanity, defined as specified acts “committed as part of a widespread or sy-
stematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” 
(‘International Criminal Court—What are crimes against humanity?’, n.d.) The acts include 
murder, extermination, enslavement and rape amongst others. If proof of an intent to 
destroy the specified group in whole or in part is also present such acts can fall within 
the meaning of the 1949 Genocide Convention as well. (United Nations, Security Council, 
1994, p. 26)
For the purposes of the following analysis however, interpretations of group destru-
ction, so far examined almost exclusively from the aspect of the physical elimination, re-
quire a deeper examination. A group is a sociocultural unit. Accordingly, Martin Shaw pro-
poses a more inclusive definition and argues, “because groups are social constructions, 
they can be neither constituted nor destroyed simply through the bodies of their individu-
al members,” as elimination “aims to suppress their identity by destroying the network 
of social relations that makes identity possible at all.” In doing so it transforms the victims 
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“into ‘nothing’ and the survivors into ‘nobodies’”. (jones, 2011, p. 29) Likewise, Cathie 
Carmichael distinguished ethnic cleansing as “not just about murder, the wanton destru-
ction of property, theft, rape and other violations and flight. It is about the destruction of 
what has been there before, an attack on memory, security and Heimat3.” (Carmichael, 
2002, p. 82) The ‘invisible’ methods of ethnic cleansing, examined in later sections, achie-
ved precisely that—the attack on the memory of the citizens of former Yugoslavia there-
by destroying the Heimat of those wishing to define themselves as Yugoslavs.
Finally, we examine the concept of ethnicity. The word ‘ethnic’ as defined by Fredrik 
barth refers to “groups of people who are considered to have a shared identity, a com-
mon history and a traditional cultural heritage.” (barth, 1969, p. 5) However, ethnic iden-
tification is flexible in that it lacks almost any ‘objective’ qualities. Indeed, the ‘objective’ 
qualities are constructed upon an aggregate of ‘objective’ differences. The total of the 
differences itself does not determine the ethnicity; the latter is determined by those dif-
ferences that the actors themselves regard as notable. Thus, ethnicity is above all the 
‘social organisation of culture difference’ and not merely the empirical distinctions it pro-
motes. (barth, 1969, p. 6) Specific cultural attributes become promoted as symbols of the 
professed distinction while others completely disregarded. Groups are fluid collections 
of people where both similarities and differences amongst individual members are con-
tinuously present since as Michael Sandel remarked, “each of us moves in an indefinite 
number of communities, some more inclusive than others, each making different claims 
to our allegiance.” (Sandel, 1982, p. 146)
The obstacle that nation-state builders in Yugoslavia had to surmount was how to clas-
sify big groups of people with hybrid identities. Prior to the development of modern nati-
on-states, the area of former Yugoslavia was marked by interacting ethnic, lingusitic and 
religious influences, producing fluid and non-exclusive identities. National identities thus 
had to be 'invented' by exalting the chosen characteristics, habitually religion or language, 
and demoting the inconsistent ones. (Malakos, 1999, p. 147)
ernst Gellner comments on the upshot of this practice, saying “[T]he members of the 
nation, and hence of the state, have simply forgotten their diversity of cultural origin.” 
(Gellner, 1997, p. 45) If an ethnic group is to survive, the constructed boundary must be 
perpetually sustained. (barth, 1969, p. 14) This can be related to the case of Yugoslavia, 
where the priority of the political elites in the Yugoslav War became the maintenance 
of this boundary. In doing so, the Yugoslav idea, which rejected creating boundaries be-
tween different nationalities and isolating them, was abolished. exploring terminology is 
key to an ‘invisible’ phenomenon. Strict observance of definitions can hinder one in re-
cognizing the subtleties of ethnic cleansing.
THE ROLE OF NATIONALITIES AND THE bREAk-up OF YugOSLAvIA
before examining methods of the invisible ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslav identity, the 
context within which they took place must be established.
Yugoslavia first originated as the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. Du-
ring WWII, the Partisans led by Tito successfully assisted in liberating the region from the 
occupying Axis powers—Germany, Italy and the Independent state of Croatia comman-
3 A German word meaning home/homeland.
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ded by the Ustaša.4 by 1945, Yugoslavia proclaimed itself a Federal Socialist republic. 
(bringa, 1995, p. 23) The republics of Yugoslavia did not exist as national territories but as 
federal units, home to different nations and nationalities. based on collective and shared 
ambitions, the Yugoslav idea was not to replace individual national groups. (Thompson, 
1992, p. 92) In order to understand the Yugoslav identity, mention of its association with 
the Yugoslav idea according to Yugoslavs must be made. To a respondent from Germany,
D. k., berlin, 2015
Yugoslav  identity  is the sum of the common cultural history of South Slavs.  […]  it does not 
conduct the stigmatisation and discrimination of different religious affiliations and it respects 
all differences as equal. [Translations were made by the author herself.]
Similarly, for a Yugoslav living in Split,
P. V., Split, 2015
[A Yugoslav  identity  to me signifies] a cultural,  civilizational and humane move  towards  the 
future and the respect for all the values originating from the time in which Yugoslavhood was 
devised.
While a Yugoslav identity did emerge in Yugoslavia, the SFrY however never officially 
envisioned the creation of Yugoslavs. Considering intermarriage was common in Yugosla-
via and reached over 10% in the 1980s, the inclusion of the Yugoslav category in official 
censuses, launched in 1961, seemed like a sensible solution for those children. (Wachtel, 
1998, p. 240) During the 1950s, ‘Yugoslav’ was either assumed to be an ethnic/national 
category by itself or acknowledged as a supranational category. (ramet, 1992, p. 50)
Under Tito’s presidency, Yugoslav nationalities policy was comprised of eight consti-
tuents, its seventh element endorsing the idea of ‘dual consciousness’, allowing for both 
ethnic consciousness and a Yugoslav consciousness to simultaneously co-exist. This was 
termed ‘Yugoslav socialist patriotism’ and was a form of wider patriotism, which did not 
debar narrower patriotism, but in fact presupposed it. (ramet, 1992, p. 54) As identity as-
sertions were never promoted in Yugoslavia, the system operated according to a principle 
of ‘brotherhood and unity’, which sought the gradual dismantlement of class differences 
that would eventually lead to the creation of an equal society. (Thompson, 1992, p. 91)
In 1980 Tito’s death produced a political vacuum that saw the emergence of new poli-
tical elites and a catastrophic economic crisis. The Croat and Serb leadership in particular, 
embodied by the figures of Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević5 respectively, gradu-
4 ustaša or Insurgents were a militant independence organization that modeled itself on the Italian Fascists. 
To make their state more purely Croatian, the ustaše set about exterminating its Serb, jewish, and roma 
inhabitants. They remained in control of the Independent State of Croatia until May 1945. (‘Ustasa | Croatian 
political movement’, n.d.)
5 Franjo Tuđman led Croatia to independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 after his party, Croatian Democratic 
Union (HDZ), won the country’s first parliamentary elections in 1990. During his presidency he pushed for 
the creation of an ethnically homogenous Croat state and remained the president of Croatia until his death in 
1999. between 1991 and 1992, Tuđman and his HDZ right-wing allies devised a secret strategy in the Croat 
majority areas of bosnia and Herzegovina by replacing moderate Croat politicians with nationalist hard-liners 
who began inciting violent conflicts in ethnically mixed Croat-Muslim regions of bosnia and Herzegovina. 
(‘Franjo Tudjman | president of Croatia’, n.d.)
 Slobodan Milošević (Serbia’s party leader and president from 1989-1997 and President of the Federal re-
public of Yugoslavia, FrY (Serbia and Montenegro) from 1997-2000) entered politics in Serbia in 1984 as 
Ivan Stambolić’s (Head of the League of Communists of Serbia) protégé but ousted his mentor in 1987 
becoming Serbia’s party leader soon afterwards. Upon assuming his position, Milošević immediately trans-
formed the language of politics in Serbia by encouraging nationalist rallies and making demands for the 
restoration of Serbia’s control over the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and kosovo, which at that point 
enjoyed extensive autonomy granted to them by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution under Tito. Milošević’s 
policy staked claims to unique Serbian ‘ethnic rights’ and included manipulation of the extensive Serbian 
diaspora throughout Yugoslavia in his campaign against Yugoslav confederalism promoted by Slovenia and 
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ally adopted a more nationalistic rhetoric, which appeared most successful in mobilising 
the populace by now highly sensitized to irreconcilable nationalist interpretations for the 
problems facing Yugoslavia generated by the intellectual classes within individual repub-
lics. Yugoslavia’s national question thereafter developed into an assertion of mutually 
exclusive nationalist ideologies, which placed the internal stability of Yugoslavia at risk. 
(banac, 1984, p. 413) The new rhetoric polarized the conflict and rejected the post-war 
political consensus Yugoslavia was constructed upon. (Magaš, 1989, p. 17) The commo-
nalities between South Slavs professed by the previous regime were now abandoned. As 
nationalists function and exist through opposition, the nation-state proved to be the opti-
mum antithesis to the multicultural Yugoslav idea. Yugoslav writer Danilo kiš defined the 
nationalist as an ignoramus, who lives only by relativism, identifying himself in opposition 
to others. The actual content of ‘the other’ becomes insignificant; “The nationalist sees 
other people in his own image—as nationalists.” (kiš, 1991, p. 18) reflecting the views 
of the author, a Yugoslav living in Ulm, Germany explained the contradiction in the attitu-
de of a Yugoslav nationalist,
F. G., Ulm, 2015
In todays post-Yugoslav countries, not only  is an ethnocide being  organised against my na-
tion, but  furthermore new ways of  identifying national  identities of  former yugoslav nations 
are  being  created. Not  a  single  national  construction  amongst  these  [ex-Yugoslav]    nations 
passed without a Yugoslav option; on the contrary, their new national identities were attained 
through a reliance on the Yugoslav idea. […]. It is precisely this feature of their national identi-
ty that is today a thorn in the side of national intellectuals. Not only do they persistently reno-
unce and prohibit any sense of Yugoslavhood (amongst themselves), on top of that they also 
renounce having any affiliation to a group of Slavic nations as well.
In modern democracies nationalism often serves as a psychological instrument capab-
le of redirecting the citizens’ attention away from domestic matters—Yugoslav’s econo-
mic crisis—and act as a way to gather the support for foreign policy objectives. (Haber-
mas, 2012, p. 288) In Yugoslavia, the idea of a nation became repeatedly used not as an 
expression of national allegiance it allegedly stood for, but as a tool for mass mobilization. 
When the conflict erupted, beginning with Slovenia in june 1991 after the republic dec-
lared its independence, it became clear that the most compelling and effective way of 
materializing ethnic identities is through war. As Anthony Smith explained, wars “are of-
ten closely associated with the foundation and liberation myths of ethnic communities,” 
suggesting, “that political action and military organisation have been decisive in the de-
velopment of ethnic community.” (Smith, 1981, p. 75) Ultimately, the 1990s Yugoslav 
Wars were not an inevitable conflict as it was often postulated. A respondent from Istria, 
Croatia, explains,
Z. S., Istria, 2015
During the war I was not too preoccupied with my national  identity. I was more engaged in 
thinking how powerless I was in opposition to the strong, financially backed up, nationalistic 
Croatia. After Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia between 
1991 and 1992, Milošević endorsed Serbian militias in their campaign to join the parts of bosnia and Croatia 
that contained large Serbian Diasporas, with Serbia proper. He maintained his power in Serbia through a pol-
icy of mass media control and by suppressing his political adversaries while forming opportunistic alliances 
with others. Indeed, in March 1991 Tuđman and Milošević held a secret meeting at which they successfully 
devised a strategy for dividing bosnia and Herzegovina. (Gagnon, 2004, pp. 160–161)
 Milošević was finally arrested by the FrY government in 2001 following NATO’s airstrike campaign against 
the FrY in 1999 and, once transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, tried 
for charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes for his role in ethnic cleansing of kosovar 
Albanians while president of FrY. (‘Slobodan Milosevic | president of Yugoslavia’, n.d.; ramet, 2005, p. 56)
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campaign from the one side and the betrayal of the communist ideology by the leaders and 
members of  the League of communists  in Yugoslavia  from the other side. For a  long  time 
I hoped it was all  just a bad dream, but with every day I became more and more convinced 
that this was the cruel reality which cannot bring anything good to the people.
The xenophobia, which eventually prevailed on the surface, did not arise from individu-
al citizens.
Ž. S., banja Luka, 2015
[…] the propaganda was frightening, even today the aggressive expressions of hostility towar-
ds one nation persist, while everyone else is presented as ‘flowers’ 6 
In fact, the real concerns of the citizens of Yugoslavia were smothered by the dea-
fening expressions of hostility. Dubravka Ugrešić summarized what war signified to the 
ordinary citizen of Yugoslavia,  
The war, the dismantling of one state and the establishment of new ones, the destruction of 
one identity and the construction of a new one, changes in language, the end of one ideolo-
gical value system and the establishment of a new one—this is the millstone which has been 
grinding down the citizen of former Yugoslavia for the last three years [1991-1994]. (Ugrešić, 
2002f, p. 15)
The gradual destruction of the Yugoslav identity brought on by war and its socio-cultu-
ral ramifications was exacerbated by the misguided and politically imprudent influence of 
the West.
THE ROLE OF THE wEST AND THE wESTERN mEDIA  IN THE bREAk-up
War analysts and commentators asserted ‘deep ethnic hatred’ amongst individual nation-
alities as the root of the conflict in Second Yugoslavia. (Udovički & ridgeway, 1995, p. 1) 
Such a simplified and misrepresented assumption, labeled ‘primordialist’ in various analy-
ses, absolved outside observers from making the political and intellectual effort to genu-
inely understand Yugoslavia’s downfall.
An ethnic conflict implies that its origins lay in collective behavior; the genesis of the 
conflict is thus wrongly placed on the people and the extreme violence that accompanied 
it becomes normalized. (Wilmer, 2002, p. 67) The narrowness of statements, which drew 
on ‘tribal’ balkan stereotypes, only reinforced the nationalistic propaganda by echoing 
the assertions made by ultranationalists. The latter claimed that ethnic differences wit-
hin Yugoslavia could never be overcome; the western observers consolidated the claim 
by restricting Yugoslavia’s past to one of ethnic conflict thereby completely disregarding 
further features of its long and intricate history. These monocausal portrayals implied ‘an 
atemporal depoliticized image of the balkans’ while nationalism became understood as 
‘the quintessential feature of the balkan condition’. (Hatzopoulos, 2003, p. 26)   
Western stereotypes of the mythical balkans continuously accompanied media re-
ports on the evolution of the Yugoslav conflict as well. As the answer to the ‘cyclical’ vio-
lence of the region, nationalism—always inferred and never questioned—facilitated the 
6 Pure, innocent.
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notion of Yugoslavia as a temporary and artificial construct, unsuited to the nationalistic 
character of its people.  (Hatzopoulos, 2003, p. 36)
As Ugrešić sneeringly remarked, the dissolution of Yugoslavia signified a liberating 
achievement to many western commentators. It was a story of a repressed people living 
under the yoke of the communist regime that finally found their happy  end in a new, 
democratic system. (Ugrešić, 2002e, p. 83) Cold War dichotomies, often entrenched in 
Western perceptions, influenced the opinion which perceived the conflict as a struggle 
between democracy and communism rather than a clash between two ultranationalist 
contentions. (Udovički & ridgeway, 1995, p. 9) Many failed to see past the veneer of 
purported chaos, where the main actors, engulfed in long-term power strategies, coor-
dinated the conduct of the war with outmost rationality. (Silber & Little, 1997, p. 27) The 
chaos created concealed their actions and deceived Western politicians and the outside 
press.
The media also served as one of the methods of invisible ethnic cleansing of the Yugo-
slav identity, which will be further explored later on in the analysis.
TEcHNOLOgIES OF  ‘INvISIbLE’ ETHNIc cLEANSINg
The elimination of the Yugoslav idea from peoples’ day-to-day reality was achieved 
through various means. Nationalism permeated the everyday reality of Yugoslav citizens 
and newly fabricated national concerns began to infiltrate the citizens’ private sphere. The 
new nationalistic climate promoted identity declarations, previously considered irrelevant. 
In the words of a Yugoslav from Croatia,
Z. S., Istra, 2015
I was born, raised and grew up  in an environment to which nationalism was completely fo-
reign. my father comes from Serbia and my mother from Istra with ancestors from Austria, 
montenegro  and  Italy. my  neighbours were  Italian,  Hungarian,  bosniak, macedonian,  Alba-
nian... I went to school with bulgarians, Romanians. I had very good relations with all of them. 
No one ever asked who are you? what are you? where are you from? we never thought abo-
ut someone’s nationality. It was irrelevant to us. what was pertinent was the willingness to 
help one another. And that is what we did. One’s personal gains were placed onto a second/
third plan. we hung out with everyone, sang their songs, celebrated their weddings, grieved 
at their funerals ... And again: wE wERE ALwAYS wILLINg TO HELp. Therefore, I can not 
be exclusively a croat, nor a Serb, nor a ... The space within these nationalistic borders is too 
tight-fitting for me. but I can be all of this, a croat, and a Serb and a ...
Similarly, a respondent from banja Luka comments on the Yugoslav identity’s inclusi-
ve character, discarded by exclusive nationalist politics.
Ž. S., banja Luka, 2015
Yugoslav identity is today mainly shaped by people that previously did not have an issue with 
how they defined themselves, i.e. they were well aware of their nationality, they were not ter-
rorised into declaring themselves as such or to declare themselves as such administratively, 
they prided themselves in this, but they never emphasised their affiliation to impair someone 
else’s ‘identity’. From 1990 onwards, a Yugoslav ‘identity’ to me implies that I do not belong 
to a single former-Yugoslav nation. […] before 1990 a Yugoslav ‘identity’ to me signified the 
want to belong to all nations because  I  found something that shapes me as a person, enri-
ches and motivates me in each former-Yugoslav nation, and defines me as a Yugoslav.
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People in Yugoslavia defined themselves with reference to many different and often 
overlapping identities. A study conducted by two Yugoslav psychologists Nikola rot and 
Nenad Havelka in 1971 measured the extent of national allegiance and values among high 
school students in Serbia. Their research revealed the degree to which nationalist separa-
tism was at that point insignificant amongst younger Serbs. (Wachtel, 1998, p. 192)
The majority of students were found to foster some kind of multiconstituent identity 
while only 20% confessed to cultivating a solely Serbian devotion. (rot & Havelka, 1973, 
p. 269) On the question of their own nationality, 64% of students responded Serb and 
32% Yugoslav; among gymnasium pupils 53% responded Serb, 41% Yugoslav, while the 
rest responded with ‘other’. (rot & Havelka, 1973, pp. 113–118)
Furthermore, the study revealed the political potential of the largest ‘sway’ group (stu-
dents with divided attachment) who if successfully mobilized could shift their allegiance 
away from the medium, substituting it for a more nationalist affiliation.
For many citizens of newly formed states, the novel emphasis on one’s membership 
in a national group signified a loss of individuality. Slavenka Drakulić recounts the loss,
in this war I am defined by my nationality, and by it alone (Drakulić, 2012, p. 56) […] whereas 
before, I was defined by my education, my job, my ideas, my character—and, yes, my natio-
nality too—now I feel stripped of all that. I am nobody because I am not a person any more.  
(Drakulić, 2012, p. 57) 
With the Yugoslav idea rejected, self-identified Yugoslavs struggled in the war and 
post-war ethos. Psychologist Marja kuzmanić’s study exploring memories and identities 
related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia explained the practice of identity formation 
as a ‘two-way process: of identifying and being identified’.  (kuzmanić, 2008, p. 19) The 
public’s acceptance, nourished by those in power, is of vital importance for an identity to 
survive unimpeded.   
A respondent from Germany recounts the lack of understanding from the public he 
often encountered,
F. G., Ulm, 2015
[…] my national identity is for many at first irrational and non-existent, while many others do 
not even accept it […]“all the constituents of my sense of nationality have in this way beco-
me practically erased and they definitely became senseless: the cultural, linguistic, economic, 
historical, territorial…” […] It is like with AIDS and leprosy patients, everyone loves and sym-
pathizes with you, but without having to have any contact with you, if possible …. 
P. similarly recounts the public’s reaction with regards to the divisions created by the 
conflict,
P., Sarajevo, 2015
I did not have any problems with who I was. The others however, did sometimes look at me 
weirdly. why am I not more radical for this or the other side? They would ask me: “why did 
you not identify yourself with us, we are ‘yours’ after all?” And then what, I stop communica-
ting with those on the other side? I still want to be able be to interact with those ‘considered 
different’ [by nationalists]. [9]
For many, like Drakulić, the political pressure transformed her identity into “an ill-fit-
ting shirt.” (Drakulić, 2012, p. 57) What she previously cherished turned into a constraint. 
“That is what the war is doing to us, reducing us to one dimension: the Nation.” (Dra-
kulić, 2012, p. 57) It was not the promotion of a national identity but the rejection of an 
alternative, the Yugoslav one, that caused distress amongst many and which thwarted 
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the self-declared Yugoslavs from being able to fully engage in and promote their identity. 
Upon receiving her new Croatian passport, Dubravka Ugrešić struggled to accept that 
everything was reduced to one dimension. She commented,
My passport has not made me a Croat. On the contrary, I am far less that today than I was 
before. […] being an ethnic ‘bastard’ or ‘schizophrenic’ is my natural choice, I even consider it a 
sign of mental and moral health. And I know that I am not alone.  (Ugrešić, 2002b, pp. 269, 279)
For everyday people living in former Yugoslavia, a choice taken by those to continue 
to exist as Yugoslavs was imperceptible or impossible to understand in the frenzy cre-
ated by the ultranationalist propaganda. The following passage indicates both the way 
in which many individuals struggled during wartime and the refuge that the Yugoslav 
identity offered,
Z. S., Istra, 2015
[…] after I finally realised that all of us that stood on the opposite side from the nationalists 
and the members of the Skj (League of communists in Yugoslavia), divided, abandoned and 
betrayed, the only ones who gave me ‘refuge’ were Yugoslavs. […] before the war I did not 
really  think  about  a  Yugoslav  nation.  I  simply  felt  like  a Yugoslav.  Then  I  realised  that  only 
them, the Yugoslavs can contest the nationalist machinery which divided the people in order 
to be able to govern more easily and steal from the people just the same.
The following methods of identity declarations, the media, historical amnesia, the 
confiscation of memory and anti-intellectual endeavors as well as new hostile aphorisms 
used to discredit the Yugoslav identity contributed to invisible ethnic cleansing.
THE mEDIA wARS
The Yugoslav war was a war engineered by the political elites: not by the people. In or-
der to suppress the instincts of Yugoslav citizens the public’s mentality had to be trans-
formed in a way that would make them liable to nationalist messages. To sustain the 
support for extreme nationalism, a planned, persistent and strictly regulated propaganda 
crusade became imperative. (Udovički & ridgeway, 1995, p. 35) Controlled by the war-
mongers, the media championed the ‘global conspiracy’ narrative, which repudiated the 
Yugoslav idea. (Ahmed, 1995, p. 12) Foreign commentators, likewise deceived by the na-
tionalistic claims, failed to recognise the extent of mutual trust present in ex-Yugoslavia.
Cooperation and trust, which tied the citizens of Yugoslavia together, were to be upro-
oted and replaced by confusion, mistrust and general malaise. (Milošević, 2000, p. 106) 
For many the inconsistency of their personal experiences and the official propaganda 
messages, coupled with the general insecurity at a time of war, was unnerving and to 
embrace the deception became a less challenging option. (Milošević, 2000, p. 122) The 
Yugoslav body politic gradually became paralyzed. reduced to a depoliticized collective, 
their agency was at first appropriated by the ultranationalists and subsequently by the 
media, entrapping them within a so-called ‘media gulag’. (Milošević, 2000, p. 126) 
Media propaganda functioned through the method of confusion. A. S. from Canterbu-
ry, Uk explained, 
“As far as I can remember, it was on television that Croats first heard that they hated Serbs” 
(Lešić, 1995, p. 142).
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both Milošević and Tuđman restricted the media to broadcasting authorized information 
only. Independent media was subject to punitive action. An independent Yugoslav TV sta-
tion Yutel, dedicated to the continuation of Yugoslavia, open-mindedness and liberal ideals, 
was classified as treacherous. (Milošević, 2000, p. 115) Any undertaking aimed at the pre-
servation of a multinational Yugoslav idea was suppressed. A mid-1991 survey conducted 
by the Institute for Political Studies in belgrade deduced that barely 8.4% of the Serbian 
television viewership was knowledgeable about critical happenings in the country. A year 
later the survey revealed that 60% of the television audience expressed full confidence in 
the validity of the news while only 7% expressed doubts. (Milošević, 2000, p. 124) In 1994 
it was established that only around 3-5% of the Serb population (300,000 citizens) had basic 
access to the media and the option to participate in it. (Milošević, 1994, p. 19)  
HISTORIcAL AmNESIA AND THE cONFIScATION OF mEmORY
If the reader envisages the state as a house, it will be easier for him to imagine that for many 
inhabitants of former Yugoslavia, along with the war and the disappearance of their country, 
many other things have been confiscated: not only their homeland and their possessions but 
also their memory. In the general and obvious misery, no one takes into account invisible los-
ses. (Ugrešić , 1996, p. 32)
The above passage written by Dubravka Ugrešić reveals the importance of memory 
in preserving an identity. The past can only be converted into memory if it is articulated. 
In post-Yugoslavia, citizens were relieved of their collective past and given a new, con-
structed national memory. (Ugrešić , 1996, p. 39)
With regards to the bygone past, the past which the ‘new’ nationalist elites shared in 
as well, the following observation made by historian Peter burke seems ideal:
It is often said that history is written by the victors. It might also be said that history is forgot-
ten by the victors [as] They can afford to forget, while the losers are unable to accept what 
happened and are condemned to brood over it, relive it, and reflect how different it might 
have been. (burke, 1989, p. 106)
pOLITIcS OF mEmORY: pOST-YugOSLAv mEmORY pOLIcY AND  ITS  ImpAcT   
ON THE EDucATION SYSTEm
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposi-
tion. […] [Memory] remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and 
forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appro-
priation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. (Nora, 1989, p. 8) 
The passage above, written by the French historian Pierre Nora, illustrates the mal-
leable nature of memory. In the domain of ‘collective memories’, what we remember 
and what we forget becomes of great significance in the way that it influences collective 
identities. These are manufactured through myths and selected memories, as well as 
through a practice of ‘collective amnesia’. (jović, 2004, p. 97)
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ernst renan defined a nation as ‘a soul […] [constituted by] a rich legacy of memo-
ries’.  (renan, 1990, p. 19)
Under authoritarian regimes, the ruling class controls the content of ‘official memo-
ries’ and the struggle for power is often fought in the field of memories/forgetting. A 
disintegration of such a regime necessarily also involves a collapse of officially imposed 
memories. (jović, 2004, p. 99) In unison, old political elites and old official memories be-
come deposed of. In Yugoslavia, the succeeding transient period, which served to rein-
force the new leadership, rapidly began to resemble the old authoritarian methods, repla-
cing the old narrative with a new one based on new official collective memories.
Communist systems were customarily adverse to the past, interpreted in accordance 
with Marxist principles as ‘a period of class exploitation and injustice, which ought to 
be replaced by a revolutionary different Future’. (jović, 2004, p. 99) Likewise in former 
Yugoslavia the past was given negative and obsolete undertones. With the collapse of 
the regime, politically motivated official memories resuscitated the forgotten and margi-
nalized past and in doing so, isolated those identities that were based on old memories. 
In Yugoslavia, the period of transition practiced the same control over official memories 
as did the communist regime.  The chaos and the political vacuum that accompanied 
the disintegration created a ‘blank sheet’ upon which new official memories could be 
constructed and the newly established collective memory became a source of new col-
lective identities. (jović, 2004, p. 99) Through the practice of forgetting the co-existence 
between individual nationalities in Yugoslavia and the practice of remembering previous 
antagonisms, namely the animosities present during the Second World War, the new po-
litical elites sought to legitimize the conflict as historically grounded and ‘self-defensive’. 
(jović, 2004, p. 102) The constraint of authorities on the collective memories was such 
that many residents of former Yugoslavia decided to completely surrender their personal 
memories. In the field of politics of memory, the period of transition, which on the surfa-
ce officially denied previous authoritarian practices, demonstrated a control over memo-
ries strikingly similar to the memory regulations practiced by the old regime. The transito-
ry phase, not at all liberal as was maintained, was in fact exceedingly anti-communist and 
anti-Yugoslav. (jović, 2004, p. 106) 
Under Second Yugoslavia, a multiethnic and multinational federation, where ethnic dif-
ferences were rarely addressed and their declarations never actively encouraged, multi-
ple, even opposing collective memories co-existed at the same time. (kuzmanić, 2008, 
p. 7) Yugoslavia was as Andrew Wachtel observed, “the quintessential battleground be-
tween collectivistic national visions based on ideals of synthesis versus those based on 
particularity”. (Wachtel, 1998, p. 17) The shift in the political climate emphasizing those 
advocating the particularity of individual member states led to eventual disintegration of 
the regime which included a change in the ‘sphere of official memories’ and a ‘rupture in 
people’s private memories, representations, traditions, as well as their social and perso-
nal identities’. (kuzmanić, 2008, p. 7)
The new political leadership erased the Yugoslav idea through anti-intellectual 
methods of historical amnesia and the confiscation of memory. In her newspaper articles, 
for which she was labeled a ‘national traitor’, Ugrešić continuously addressed the perils 
of memory manipulation, ‘the terror of forgetfulness’ and the oblivion of one’s past.
Terror by remembering is a strategy by which the continuity (apparently interrupted) of natio-
nal identity is established, terror by forgetting is the strategy whereby a ‘Yugoslav’ identity 
and any remote prospect of its being re-established is wiped out. (Ugrešić , 2002e, p. 80)
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A modern nation exists through what ernst rennan defined as the praxis of oblivion. 
(Gellner, 1997, p. 45) Correspondingly, Ugrešić writes,
The builders of the new state, the new masters of oblivion, are eliminating everything that 
reminds people of the old country. (…) An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, the black hole of 
oblivion will suck us all in.” (Ugrešić , 2002a, p. 109)
Politicians used pseudo-intellectual methods to rewrite the past by manipulating col-
lective memory, which was  
erased and rewritten, deconstructed, constructed and reconstructed, confiscated and recon-
fiscated, proclaimed politically correct or incorrect […]. The political battle is a battle for the 
territory of collective memory (Ugrešić , 1996, p. 34).
Furthermore,
Ž. S., banja Luka, 2015
Not a single former-Yugoslav country has an impartial approach to this question [of Yugosla-
via] (for some it was a prison of nations, for others the prosperity of nations).
Culture became a victim of memory loss as well. An émigré from berlin, laments the 
cultural deprivation, which occurred as a result of nationalistic isolation.  
D. k., berlin, 2015
croatia‘s  current official  culture  scene  is  for me a  sterile  and  rigid product of  the new era, 
robbed of its balkan tradition, which the ruling elites that emerged during the war, aspire to 
distance themselves from.
Collective memory was manipulated by the reinterpretation of the past, which was 
revealed in education as well. education, apart from benefitting an individual also empha-
sizes how one can serve the larger collective, including the national community and due 
to this aspect schools frequently become prone to political exploitation. (Smith, 1991, 
p. 118) In his discussion on the power of dominant ideologies and how they are instil-
led and maintained with the ordinary members of society, Louis Althusser identified two 
apparatuses employed by the state for this goal which take on a form of recognizable 
state institutions: the repressive State Apparatus, which operates through violence and 
the Ideological State Apparatuses, which function ‘by ideology’. (Althusser, 2001, p. 97) 
The first refers to organs such as the police, the military and the courts and the second 
to schools, the state’s cultural institutions, the media, etc. When different ideologies are 
being contested the grasp of the Ideological State Apparatus intensifies. Correspondingly, 
the institution of the School communicates its ‘know-how’ in conformance with the ruling 
ideology with the intention of subjecting individuals to it or to teach them ‘the mastery of 
its ‘practice’’. (Althusser , 2001, p. 89) As Althusser writes, it is the overall ruling ideology 
which perpetuates the harmony between the repressive and the Ideological state insti-
tutions and therefore ensures the ideology’s endurance and its unconscious acceptance 
amongst individuals.
After the break up of SFrY, school curriculums of the newly independent states were 
altered in ways that complied with topical political requirements and their impact, particu-
larly on the study of history, can be observed to this day.
Following the initial transitional period, which rejected the previously inviolable Marxist 
understanding of history, the past was once more subjugated to dogmatic analysis and 
reinterpreted along new nationalistic paradigms. Old myths were substituted by new 
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ones, which drew the majority of their content from resuscitated mythology pertaining to 
the period of balkan nation state formation.
In former Yugoslavia students were exposed to authors from every Yugoslav nationality. 
D. k., berlin, 2015
[...]  the generations  from former Yugoslavia grew up with Slovenian, Serbian, montenegrin, 
bosnian, croat and macedonian authors, who made up an integral part of the school curricu-
lum, and that everyone felt and believed to be a part of their own cultural tradition. The wealth 
of Yugoslav diversity  in every domain  (not only  the cultural  sphere)  constituted  the core of 
Yugoslavia.
After the break up, individual national histories were fabricated through what eric Hobs-
bawm described as ‘retrospective mythology’. (Hobsbawm, 2012, p. 255) History, tra-
ditionally regarded as an objective informant and a source of ethnicity, now took the form 
of ‘synchronic rhetoric’, whose endeavor thereby became the appropriation of the past. 
(barth, 1969, p. 6)
Z. S., Istra, 2015
It  is a known fact  that history  is written by  the winners. According  to  this new history  that 
is being taught in schools, Yugoslavia is portrayed as a dictatorship, as a prison of nations... 
As might be expected, little is said about today’s situation in this country [croatia], and when 
something is said then it  is bright, beautiful and everything is narrowed down to a common 
denominator – wE AcHIEvED INDEpENDENcE. Every discussion begins and ends here.
A respondent from berlin similarly comments on the change in the school curriculum.
D. k., berlin, 2015
Today‘s generations can only educate themselves about Yugoslavia through unofficial sourc-
es, outside of the public school curriculum. It is enough to just look at school textbooks to re-
alise which direction education is going in, for example in croatia. books are (especially in the 
field of history) filled with pseudo science, lies and unfortunately, hatred. New history is being 
invented that is not related to actual historical facts whatsoever. […] generations are raised in 
isolation and in a fragmentary way, outside of any real world context.
A 2002 survey conducted by the Center for Democracy and reconciliation in Sout-
heast europe entitled clio  in  the balkans uncovered the format of history education in 
South east europe and the influence of political pressure onto it with a special focus on 
the content and the oftentimes-biased perspective introduced by schoolbooks. The study 
found that the shared past of separate nations, composed of general history, national hi-
story and the history of individual nations as it was taught in former Yugoslavia, had been 
replaced by competing ethnocentric narratives. For example, national history makes up 
30% of contemporary history curriculums in Slovenia, 50% in Croatia and 70% in Serbia. 
(koulouri, 2002, p. 538)
Furthermore, previously emphasised mutual understanding was replaced by historical 
evidence of intolerance amongst the nations of Yugoslavia to account for and reflect con-
temporary hostilities and moreover portray the resurgence of antagonisms as a ‘revival’ 
and the conflict as inevitable. The bulk of common Yugoslav history has been taken out 
of textbooks while the remnants were generally appraised in the negative. Through com-
parison, individual democracies recognized their treatment in the collective as unfair and 
produced emotive narratives of victimhood. (koulouri, 2002, p. 39) As Stevan Pawlowitch 
commented, “Memory remembers what ‘they’ did to ‘us’ and forgets what ‘we’ did to 
‘them’.” (Pawlowitch, 2004, p. 66)
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regarding the Yugoslav idea, its advent in the 19th century is covered variously: neu-
trally evaluated in Slovenian schoolbooks, positively in bosnian, Macedonian, Montene-
grin and Croatian (in the latter, it is depicted as the foundation of the modern Croatian 
state) and cautiously in Serbian sources, due to its supposed Croatian accent. (koulouri, 
2002, p. 197)
Truth is an outcome of power relations; power is utilized in the construction of truth to 
produce the Truth. Different truths come into conflict when one is manufactured in a way 
that devalues the other. (Mertus, 1999, p. 4) Post-Yugoslav states epitomized the power 
play engaged in truth formation, the contest particularly evident in the content of history 
schoolbooks, which are but a reflection of the society that produces them. A respondent 
from Split imparts the power of the nationalist focus on the education and therefore the 
mindset of entire communities,
P. V., Split, 2015
Nationalistic propaganda will continue to strive to ‘brainwash’ through falsifications, carry out 
the revision of historical truths, threaten, declare us as internal enemies and turn the methods 
of information and the intellectuals against us.
THE NEw  ‘TERmINOLOgY’ OF wAR
The ambitions of most extreme nationalists are challenged when the nation-state does 
not succeed in converging all of its members as well as when it accepts a number of non- 
members. (Gellner, 1997, p. 4) The reluctance of Yugoslavs to adopt the newly enginee-
red polarization of the nations made them incompatible with the nationalist agenda. Since 
the number of Yugoslavs—the ‘non-members’—is small in comparison to other national 
groups, they can be discredited as what A.P. branded a “statistical error.” Those who 
refused to consent to the political divisions, Yugoslavs included, became stigmatized as 
national traitors. A new idiom was invented to delegitimize Yugoslavs and other ‘national 
traitors’, Yugonostalgia. The regime in power employed the term to discredit their politi-
cal opponents.  
Z. S., Istra, 2015
As ‘Yugonostalgia’ was a term created with the intention of making even the remembrance 
of the name Yugoslavia negative, it leads to an aversion towards everything related to Yugo-
slavia.
P. V., Split, 2015
by  using  this  concept,  the  nationalists  openly  express  their  fear  of  Yugoslavhood,  express 
their fear of the return of those values which where specific to the Yugoslav reality, what it 
was known for – socialism, self-management, equality, freedom, creativity, etc.
In the new metaphorical vocabulary of former Yugoslav nations, the Yugoslav idea 
has come to signify a return to communism. (Ugrešić, 2002d, p.179) Legitimate claims 
made by the Yugoslav minority could be discredited if they were labeled as Yugonostal-
gic and thus connected to the bygone ideology. A respondent from Sarajevo ironically 
remarked,
D. k., Sarajevo, 2015
who were the new nationalists? Old communists!
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For Yugoslavs, Yugoslavia was not a political conviction or a place permeated with 
ideological undertones; it was the reality into which they were born and a place they inha-
bited. They lived there and then. (Lešić, 1995, p. 18)
P., Sarajevo, 2015
Everyone  has migrated  and  changed  through  time. we  are  not  the  same people we were 
twenty  years  ago, which means we can not  be  the  same Yugoslavs  that we were  twenty 
years ago. In the past, Yugoslavia changed its name and its format a number of times. Each 
structure existed independently as it was. None was related to its predecessor. why are we?
When the term Yugonostalgia is used as a politically distortive description for Yugo-
slavs, it imprisons and paralyses them in the past. Yugoslavs who are ‘lost in history’ 
can then be juxtaposed against the self-professed modern and progressive endeavors of 
nationalist politicians. The term Yugonostalgia functions as a method of promoting those 
politicians who allegedly work towards the future, and a way to discredit opposing groups 
who ‘lost their touch with reality’. Yugonostalgia “[belongs] to the new terminology of 
war.” (Ugrešić, 1996, p. 36)
cONcLuSION
The cleansing of Yugoslav identity was never a part of a deliberate political agenda. The 
conflict, however, was manipulated and orchestrated in ways that would destroy the Yu-
goslav idea on which the identity in question was derived from. Forced identity declara-
tions, the hijacking of the media and various anti-intellectual efforts were the methods 
used to cleanse ex-Yugoslavia of the remnants of its past.
by using the concept of invisible ethnic cleansing, the following analysis draws atten-
tion to the need to give thought to and inquire into human groups who identify with state 
and nation projects that were in effect completely erased from the socio-political reality 
of their subjects by other projects of this type. Similarly to Yugoslavia, the break-up of Au-
stro-Hungary, Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union could have resulted in a loss of identity 
for those factions that identified themselves with the broader state ideals rather than the 
narrower category of one’s ethnicity or nationality. Moreover, the analysis of Yugoslavs 
demonstrates the ease with which authorities can achieve an erasure of an entire group’s 
identity through a centralized programme that exerts control over the intellectual sphere, 
namely education and media control.  
The concept of invisible ethnic cleansing might have contemporaneous implications as 
well; the recent increase in the support for Scottish independence both within Scotland 
as well as elsewhere around the world could signify the end of Great britain in the near 
future. With 10,690,999 people or 19.1% of the british population declaring themselves 
as ‘british only’ in a 2011 census examining national identity in england and Wales, a bre-
ak-up of Great britain could signify a loss of identity for those who feel an affiliation to 
the ‘british’ idea unless able to uphold it after the loss of the country. (Office for National 
Statistics, 2011) 
In my analysis I have attempted to accomplish three tasks; to show that in Yugosla-
via, despite claims suggesting its ‘artificiality’ and the seething ‘primordial ethnic hatred’, 
explanations which surfaced following its break-up, in the words of Andrew Wachtel 
‘there was in fact something to destroy’. (Wachtel, 1998, p. 227) Indeed, in his analysis 
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Wachtel demonstrated the significance of the Yugoslav national idea, which he believed 
to be far closer to the Italian or German national idea rather than the more politically con-
venient forms such as those arising in the context of postcolonial Africa. (Wachtel, 1998, 
p. 228) The study of Yugoslavs and their commitment to the Yugoslav idea serves as a 
counterweight to dominant narratives, mainly the often-shortsighted Western accounts 
or the politicized versions of events that strive to represent the conflict and the disinte-
gration as inevitable and the violence accompanying it as inherent.  
Second, the study sought to introduce a novel concept of invisible ethnic cleansing, 
a frequent and unacknowledged companion of disintegrating multinational empires. by 
emphasizing the need for a more inclusive inquiry, a comparative history that can under-
mine the indoctrination with ‘objective’ truths, the study seeks to ensure that all losses 
are accounted for. “On the priority list of losses […] the first place is the loss of life itself, 
then the loss of those closest, then material goods. Only then come, if they ever do, in-
tangible losses.” (Ugrešić , 1996, p. 32)
Finally, by situating the ‘intangible’ losses within the destruction of the Yugoslav state 
and citizen, this study seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
Yugoslav conflict.
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